India’s official poverty estimates
are based on the regular consumer expenditure surveys conducted by the National
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). These surveys, pioneered by P. C. Mahalanobis
in the 1940s and 1950s (Mahalanobis and Sen in 1954) were the world’s first
system of household surveys to apply the principles of random sampling
established in 1920s and 1930s.
The NSSO conducts both large and
small surveys while the Planning Commission uses the larger ones on the ground
that they are required to estimate poverty accurately for each state and those
estimates are the basis for transfers from the central government to the state
governments. These official poverty estimates count the number of people living
n households with monthly per capita total expenditure below a poverty line
specific to state and sector (rural or urban). The poverty lines are updated
periodically using a system of state-by-state price indices which are estimated
separately for rural households (the consumer price index for agricultural
laborers) and urban households (the consumer index for industrial laborers). Rural
and urban poverty estimates for each state are aggregated for all the states
and an all India poverty line is set up that matches the sum of state counts.
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND SAMPLE
SURVEYS
Before the 1990s, the planning
commission used the national accounts estimate of consumption as a control
total for the surveys in estimating poverty. Thus, for example, if the ratio of
national accounts to the survey estimate of mean consumption was greater than
one, the commission would multiply the expenditure of each household by that
ratio before calculating the number of people living in households below the
poverty line. This gave rise to a debate: does
the growth measured in the national accounts show up in improvements in the
living standards of the poor?
During the 1990s the national
accounts estimates of mean consumption grew much more rapidly than did the
survey estimates. Scaling up thus would have shown a more rapid reduction in
poverty in the 1990s than by the survey estimates. Those who believe that the
economic growth following the reforms has been associated with large scale
poverty reduction have tended to argue that national accounts are right and
surveys are wrong. While the early comparisons between the national income and
surveys are similar with even a coinciding show in distribution pattern of
income and consumption, the recent comparisons are anything but.
The use of outdated rates and ratios in a growing
economy experiencing structural development will
typically lead to systematic trend errors in the accounts. Consider the netting out of intermediate production from
value added, which is frequently done using a
fixed ratio. Because the degree of intermediation tends to grow as the economy becomes more complex and more
monetized, the rate of growth of GDP and of consumption
will be systematically overstated in a growing economy. Cooking oil,
particularly vanaspati, provides a good example for India. The national
accounts estimate consumption of vanaspati as total production less imports plus exports, less consumption by
government or business. In an economy in
which all vanaspati is used for household cooking, this gives the right answer.
But as the economy grows, consumers eat more meals out, so that an increasing
fraction of vanaspati is used by
commercial food suppliers, restaurants, hotels, and street vendors. Consumer spending on these services is
derived from (fairly shaky) data on the
gross output of the services sector, adjusted to a value-added basis by
deducting the value of intermediate
inputs, including vanaspati. At best, this adjustment is done using one of the rates and ratios, which
means progressive and increasing overstatement
if intermediation increases with income and if rates and ratios are infrequently adjusted. In the case of vanaspati in
India, no adjustment is made at all, so
that all vanaspati used in restaurants is counted twice, helping overstate the
rate of growth of consumption and GDP and to increase the ratio of national accounts to survey consumption.
METHODOLOGY
An important design issue for poverty
measurement is the length of the reporting period. The NSSO had adopted a
uniform 30-day recall period, based on experiments
carried out by Mahalanobis and Sen (1954) in the 1950s. A questionnaire with a 7-day
reporting period for high-frequency items (food, pan, tobacco), 365 days for low-frequency items
(durable goods, clothing, footwear, institutional
[hospital] medical care, and educational expenses), and 30 days for everything
else gave poverty counts that were only half of those derived from the questionnaire with a uniform 30-day reporting
period.
The reduction in measured poverty comes from two quite
separate effects. The first is that a higher rate of monthly expenditure is
reported when people are asked to report food, pan,
and tobacco over the past 7 days rather than over the past 30 days. Higher reported expenditure, other things being
equal, decreases measured poverty. The second
effect comes from the low-frequency items. Although the mean reported expenditure for this category decreases
for the longer reporting period, the lower tail of
the distribution increases. With 30-day reporting periods, most households
report no purchase of low-frequency items, but in 365-day periods most
households report at least some purchases. Thus despite the decrease in the mean, the longer reporting period for the
low-frequency items also acts to reduce
measured poverty. Measures of inequality are substantially reduced by moving
from a 30-day to a 365-day reporting period
for low-frequency items. Because the mean falls and the bottom tail increases,
measured dispersion in these purchases is much reduced, and this carries through to total expenditure. This means
that it is never legitimate to compare measured inequality across surveys with
different reporting periods without some
sort of correction.
POVERTY LINE(S)
Although the recent debate on poverty in India
has focused mainly on the measurement of
expenditures, poverty lines are equally important. How they are updated and adjusted across regions or urban and rural households
have a major effect on poverty estimates. In India, as in many other
countries, a base poverty line is adjusted
across time and space using price indexes, so the selection and construction of these indexes become a key input into poverty
measurement.
The history of poverty lines in India is a case study in
the interaction of science and politics, with
political decisions often claiming a scientific basis, sometimes with justification, more often without. Although poverty
lines are often linked to the amount of money
needed for a minimally adequate diet, the use and long-term survival of
poverty lines depend on policymakers and others accepting them as useful. For example, Rudra (1974), in discussing the history of
Indian poverty lines up to that time and the
persistence of the "magic number" of 20 rupees per head in 1960/ 61 prices shows that a food-based analysis would lead to
a considerably higher number. Yet the magic number
persisted, as similar magic numbers have persisted in other countries, not because they are correct but because,
once established as useful in economic and political
discussions, poverty lines are resistant to change.
From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s the Planning
Commission used only two poverty lines for per
capita household expenditure, 49 rupees for rural households and 57
rupees for urban households at 19 73/ 74 prices, which was close to the 15 percent urban price differential estimated by
Bhattacharya and Chatterjee (1971) using
unit value data from the National Sample Survey. The poverty lines were held constant in real terms and were converted to
current rupees using the implicit price deflator of consumption in the national accounts. This process ignored
interstate differences in price
levels and in urban to rural price differentials. Furthermore, the national accounts consumption deflator is probably
not the best measure of inflation for
households near the poverty line. These problems and several others were dealt
with by an expert group in 1993 (India, Expert Group on Estimation of
Proportion and Number of Poor 1993). Their recommendations for new poverty
lines were adopted (in somewhat
modified form) by the Planning Commission, and these poverty lines have been used in official
calculations since 1983.
The expert group poverty lines have a serious flaw,
however: the urban to rural price differentials
that they imply are too large to be credible. It is unclear how this happened, whether because of an error in calculation or
because the price indexes used in the
calculations produced the result through some unexpected cumulative effect. The state by state urban and rural poverty lines
were calculated independently, without
consideration of the implicit urban to rural price differentials. In any case,
the average ratio of urban to rural poverty lines is around 1.4 and varies widely across states. As a result, official headcount measures of
poverty are higher in urban than in
rural areas in some states, and the all-India headcount ratios differ little for urban and rural areas. In Andhra Pradesh,
which is the most dramatic example,
the 1999/2000 official estimates give a poverty rate of 27.2 percent for urban areas and only 10.8 percent for rural areas.
Another serious issue is the accuracy of the inflation
rate used in the state-level price indexes. Errors
in the indexes will induce errors in the trend rate of poverty reduction. These indexes are reweighted infrequently. For
example, until 1995 the consumer price index for
agricultural laborers used weights based on a 1960/61 survey. And although this index and the index for
industrial workers are almost certainly better than the price deflator of
national accounts consumption, it is unclear whether
the prices or the weights that go into these indexes are the right ones for a national poverty measure.
(New benchmarks by the Planning Commission, submitted in an
affidavit to the Supreme Court as part of new food
security legislation, suggest that a person living on more than Rs32 ($0.64) a
day in urban areas, like New Delhi and Mumbai, would no longer be classified as
being below the poverty line. The threshold for rural areas would be Rs26 a
day. By comparison, the World Bank’s poverty line is $1.25 a day.)
LESSONS
There is no suggestion here that the statistical
failures in India in the 1990s were the
result of undue interference by politicians or policymakers in data collection
or publication. Yet politics in the broad sense
played a role. In evaluating the reforms, the political right had an interest
in showing low poverty, and the political left in showing high poverty, and this undoubtedly intensified
the debate on survey design and led to the
unfortunate compromise design that temporarily undermined the poverty
monitoring system. This politicization of
data collection and interpretation is often bemoaned. Yet political
accountability is essential to poverty reduction, and policymakers have a legitimate interest in monitoring the statistical system
and asking for changes that serve their interests.
Mistakes are inevitable, and survey data can be
compromised by internal and external
factors. Thus poverty assessments will often have to be made using imperfectly comparable
surveys. India's experience illustrates the possibility of repairs to enhance the credibility of estimates. But that
experience also demonstrates that repairs,
however creative, are a poor substitute for the collection of clean, credible, and comprehensive data. What are convincing
assumptions to one person can be unconvincing
to another, and political positions inevitably influence the assumptions that people are prepared to make or accept.
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